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Abstract. - Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game is studied where initially
all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the
strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their
neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We
show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high
temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential
fit best characterizing their degree distributions. In particular, there exist an optimal maximal
degree for the promotion of cooperation, warranting the best exchange of information between
influential players.
Introduction. – Complex networks, and scale-free
networks in particular, have been identified as potent pro-
moters of cooperation in all major types of social dilem-
mas [1]. Especially the prisoner’s dilemma, being one
of the most widely applicable games [2], as well as the
snowdrift and ultimatum games, have thus far been stud-
ied on diluted [3, 4] and hierarchical networks [5], ran-
dom graphs [6], small-world [7–9] and real empirical net-
works [10], as well as games on graphs in general [11]. Ar-
guably the most important feature of complex networks
responsible for the promotion of cooperation is the het-
erogeneous linkage of participating players, which is due
to large differences in the degrees of constitutive nodes.
Indeed, studies have shown that masking the heterogene-
ity via the introduction of participation costs or the usage
of normalized or effective payoffs [12–15] eliminates exces-
sive benefits for cooperators and yields results similar to
those reported on regular square lattices [16–19]. Since
heterogeneities due to complex interactions networks have
proven wildly successful in promoting cooperation, similar
characteristics have been introduced also via differences in
the influence and teaching activities of players [20–22] and
social diversity [23, 24].
Besides introducing the relevant heterogeneities arti-
ficially, recently it has been shown that the latter can
emerge also spontaneously as a part of a coevolutionary
process accompanying the evolution of strategies. Partic-
ularly, in Ref. [25] the teaching activity was considered as
an evolving property of players, and it has been shown that
simple coevolutionary rules may lead to highly heteroge-
neous distributions of teaching activity from an initially
non-preferential setup, which in turn promotes coopera-
tion in social dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma
or the snowdrift game. Moreover, similar results were ob-
tained by Poncela et al. [26], who considered a coevolution-
ary preferential attachment and growth scheme to gener-
ate complex networks on which cooperation can thrive.
An important precursor to these studies were works con-
sidering the coevolution of strategy and structure [27] as
well as random or intentional rewiring procedures [28–31],
showing that they as well may help to maintain cooper-
ative behavior. Interestingly, similar effects can also be
observed if the players are allowed to move on the lattice
during the strategy evolution [32].
In this letter, we propose a new model based on a sim-
ple coevolutionary rule that, alongside the evolution of
the cooperative and the defective strategy within the pris-
oner’s dilemma game, entails increasing the neighborhood
of players by allowing them to make new permanent con-
nections with the not yet linked neighbors. The only con-
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dition necessary to exercise this is a successful pass of the
player’s strategy to one of its current opponents. Since
each reproduction is considered as a statement of success
of the donor player at that time, the latter is rewarded
by the expansion of its neighborhood. Thus, the basic
premise of the proposed coevolutionary rule is that in real
social systems the more successful individuals will typi-
cally have more associates than the less successful ones.
Related to this, we study the impact of different limits
with respect to the maximal degree an individual is al-
lowed to obtain during the coevolutionary process, as well
as the degree distribution of thereby resulting networks.
Starting from a fully homogeneous and non-preferential
setup where each player is linked only to its four near-
est neighbors on a square lattice, we show that the model
can sustain cooperation even at high temptations to de-
fect, and moreover, that the resulting networks are highly
heterogeneous with roughly an exponential degree distri-
bution. In addition, we shed light on the observed phe-
nomena by studying the interconnectedness of influential
players and the information exchange between them. Our
results suggest that ‘making new friends’ is an essential
part of the evolutionary process, playing a crucial role by
the sustainability of cooperation in environments prone to
defection.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows.
First, we describe the prisoner’s dilemma game and the
protocol for the coevolution of neighborhoods. Next we
present the results, whereas lastly we summarize and dis-
cuss their implications.
Game definitions and setup. – We consider an evo-
lutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with cooperation and
defection as the two competing strategies. The game is
characterized by the temptation to defect T = b, reward
for mutual cooperation R = 1, and both the punishment
for mutual defection P as well as the suckers payoff S
equaling 0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper pay-
off ranking. Initially, each player x is designated either
as a cooperator (C) or defector (D) with equal probabil-
ity and linked to its four nearest neighbors on a regular
L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions,
thus having degree k = 4. This setup warrants that ini-
tially all players have equal chances of success, which is
crucial for evaluating the impact of the proposed coevolu-
tionary rule. We note, however, that below results are ro-
bust against variations in the initial conditions, as well as
variations in the parametrization of the prisoner’s dilemma
game. The evolution of the two strategies is performed in
accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a ran-
domly selected player x acquires its payoff px by playing
the game with all its kx neighbors. Next, one randomly
chosen neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff
py by playing the game with all its ky neighbors. Last, if
px > py player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on player
y in accordance with the probability
W (sx → sy) = (px − py)/bkq, (1)
where kq is the largest of kx and ky. The introduction of kq
is necessary since the degree kx is presently subject to evo-
lution as well. In particular, each time player x succeeds in
passing its strategy to player y the degree kx is increased
by an integer ∆k according to kx → kx+∆k, whereby for
simplicity we here use ∆k = 1. Practically, the increase of
degree kx is realized so that player x establishes a perma-
nent new connection with a not yet connected player which
is selected randomly amongst the direct neighbors of the
current neighborhood of x. Thus, successful players are al-
lowed to grow compact large neighborhoods that are cen-
tered around their initial four nearest neighbors. Notably,
similar results as will be reported below can be obtained
if players extend their neighborhoods via long-range con-
nections, but since we primarily wanted to eschew effects
of resulting small-world topologies [7] and focus solely on
the impact of coevolutionary extending neighborhoods, we
here present the results obtained with the former model.
The described coevolutionary rule would eventually result
in a fully connected graph, which in turn would prevent
the survival of cooperation due to the applicability of the
well-mixed limit. Accordingly, to abridge the latter effect
we introduce kmax as the maximal degree a player is al-
lowed to obtain. In fact, the coevolutionary process of
making new connections is stopped as soon as the degree
k of a single player within the whole population reaches
kmax, whereby this limit prevents the formation of a ho-
mogeneous system and will be one of the main parameters
to be varied below. Despite being strikingly simple, the
proposed protocol for the coevolution of neighborhoods is
remarkably robust, delivering conclusive results with re-
spect to the final distribution of k as well as the two com-
peting strategies.
In accordance with the random sequential update, each
individual is selected once on average during a full Monte
Carlo step (MCS), which consists of repeating the above
elementary steps L2 times corresponding to all partici-
pating players. Monte Carlo results were obtained on
populations comprising 100 × 100 to 400 × 400 individ-
uals, whereby the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC
was determined within 105 to 106 MCS after sufficiently
long transients were discarded. Moreover, as the coevo-
lutionary process yields highly heterogeneous interaction
networks, thus yielding heavily fluctuating outputs, final
results were typically averaged over 200 independent runs
for each set of parameter values in order to take into ac-
count the stochastic feature of host graph topology result-
ing from the coevolutionary process.
Results. – The remarkable impact of the above de-
fined coevolutionary process is demonstrated in Fig. 1,
where the time evolution of ρC obtained with and without
the inclusion of coevolution is presented. The difference
between the two outcomes is evident as the basic version
p-2
Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
 
 0.8
 
 1
 10 -3  10 -2  10 -1  10 0  10 1  10 2  10 3  10 4  10 5  10 6
ρ C
time [MCS]
Fig. 1: Time evolutions of ρC obtained for b = 1.24. Dashed
line shows results obtained in the absence of the coevolutionary
neighborhood growth, while the solid line depicts the outcome
of the prisoner’s dilemma game if kmax = 50. Note that the
x-axis has a logarithmic scale on which fractions of the first
full MCS are shown as well for clarity.
of the game fails to sustain cooperative behavior (dashed
line) while the inclusion of the coevolutionary process is
able to recover it and maintain respectable ρC = 0.66
(solid line). Clearly thus, the newly proposed model is
able to sustain cooperation in regions of b where the regu-
lar square lattice interaction topology fails. However, it is
interesting to note that this is true for the final outcome of
the game, whereas during the first 100 MCS it seems that
the cooperative behavior will actually fare better without
the inclusion of the coevolutionary process. Note that the
solid line drops slightly faster than the dashed line dur-
ing the initial phase of the game. Yet rather surprisingly,
the tide then shifts in favor of the cooperative strategy as
depicted by the solid line in Fig. 1; a feature that cannot
be observed in case the coevolution of neighborhoods is
absent. Figure 1 also suggests that, while the results are
essentially robust against variations of initial conditions,
the initial density of cooperators shouldn’t be too low, as
otherwise the promotive impact of coevolution could be
missed.
To sharpen the facilitative effect of the coevolutionary
rule on the cooperative behavior, we present stationary
values of ρC in dependence on kmax for three different
values of b in Fig. 2. It can be inferred that there exist
an optimal maximal degree kmax a player is allowed to
obtain during the coevolutionary process at which coop-
eration thrives best. This holds irrespective of b, although
the optimal values of kmax fluctuate between 50 and 70.
The non-monotonous dependence on kmax, illustrated in
Fig. 2, is a consequence of the limited support for cooper-
ation offered by the square lattice (results obtained at val-
ues of kmax equal or close to 4), and the well-mixed limit
that is reached for high kmax. Note that kmax comparable
with the system size inevitably lead to a high degree of
interconnectedness amongst the players, which is charac-
 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
 
 0.8
 
 1
 0      50      100     150     200
ρ C
kmax
Fig. 2: Promotion of cooperation in dependence on kmax for
b = 1.15 (open squares), b = 1.2 (closed squares), and b = 1.28
(open circles). There exists an optimal value of kmax at which
ρC is maximal. Lines are solely guides to the eye.
teristic for a well-mixed population. In between the two
extremes, the coevolutionary rule obviously yields a favor-
able host graph topology for the evolution of cooperation.
Figure 3 shows ρC in dependence on b for three dif-
ferent values of kmax, whereby it can be observed that
the optimal value of kmax = 50 is able to sustain some
fraction of cooperators almost halfway through the whole
span of b. By comparison, in the absence of the coevo-
lutionary process (note that kmax = 4 leaves the initial
topology unaltered) the cooperative trait goes extinct at
b = 1.115. Moreover, large values of kmax still yield some
advantages for the cooperators, as can be inferred from the
kmax = 200 curve depicted in Fig. 3, yet increasing kmax
even further introduces well-mixed-like conditions where
the sustainability of cooperation is practically absent even
for low values of b.
Before turning our attention to networks emerging due
to the proposed coevolutionary rule, we test above results
against the separation of time scales [33], presently char-
acterizing the evolution of strategies and structure. Thus
far, the two time scales were treated as identical since ev-
ery successful reproduction was followed by an increase
in the player’s degree. The model can be generalized
via a parameter q that determines the probability of de-
gree extension after a successful strategy pass. Evidently,
q = 1 recovers the originally proposed model while de-
creasing q result in increasingly separated time scales. At
q = 0 the model becomes equivalent to the spatial model
without coevolution, hence yielding ρC = 0 by high b, as
demonstrated in Fig. 4. An increase in q, resulting in a
moderately fast yet effective coevolution, is beneficial for
cooperation since influential cooperators can then extend
their neighborhoods and thus become stronger by collect-
ing higher payoffs already during the coevolutionary pro-
cess. Oppositely, influential defectors become weaker as
their defecting neighborhoods grow, which ultimately re-
sults in the highest cooperation levels at intermediate q.
p-3
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Fig. 3: Promotion of cooperation in dependence on b for
kmax = 4 (open squares), kmax = 50 (closed squares), and
kmax = 200 (open circles). Cooperators are most successful if
kmax = 50, which roughly corresponds to the peak values of
ρC depicted in Fig. 2. Lines are solely guides to the eye.
However, further increasing q can generate a slight down-
ward trend of ρC because the influential cooperators can-
not take full advantage of their newly acquired neighbors
within the short time between consecutive building steps,
and thus defectors can gain a slight yet permanent advan-
tage. The moderate decrease in ρC due to the too fast
network evolution if compared to the strategy evolution
is, however, virtually absent by very high b, since then
the dominating feature is the final heterogeneous network
topology rather than initial fights of dominance. For sim-
plicity, and to preserve comparability with the results in
the first three figures, we will continue to use q = 1 in
what follows.
Next, we examine properties of networks resulting from
the coevolutionary process. As heterogeneity is the most
important property favoring cooperation, we first focus
on the degree distribution P (k). Given the fact that sub-
stantial promotion of cooperation was in the past often
associated with strongly heterogeneous states, either in
form of the host network [1] or social diversity [23, 24], it
is reasonable to expect that P (k) will exhibit similar fea-
tures as well. Results presented in Fig. 5 clearly attest
to this expectation as the semi-log plot of the distribu-
tion reveals a highly heterogeneous outlay of P (k) that
can be most accurately described by an exponential fit.
The latter feature is crucial for the fortified facilitative
effect on cooperation outlined in Figs. 2 and 3, in par-
ticular since it incubates cooperative clusters around in-
dividuals with high k, as described previously in [1] and
reviewed in [11]. Contrary, since the positive feedback of
the imitating environment is not associated with influen-
tial defectors they therefore fail to survive even if temp-
tations to defect are large. As already noted, a similar
behavior underlies the cooperation-facilitating mechanism
reported for the scale-free network where players with the
largest connectivity (presently equivalent to those having
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Fig. 4: Cooperation level ρC in dependence on the time sepa-
ration between strategy and structure updating q for b = 1.2
(open squares), b = 1.25 (closed squares), and b = 1.3 (open
circles). The maximal degree was limited to kmax = 50 for all
three values of b. Lines are solely guides to the eye.
k close to kmax) also act as robust sources of coopera-
tion in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Noteworthy since
it is related to time courses presented in Fig. 1, before
the heterogeneous network topology fully evolves, defec-
tors temporarily thrive since they gain a larger base of
neighbors to exploit. Once, however, the prime spots of
the evolved network are overtaken by cooperators the de-
fectors start loosing ground fast, which explains the initial
drop and the subsequent recovery of cooperative behavior
depicted by the solid line in Fig. 1. The presently re-
ported spontaneous emergence of the heterogeneous dis-
tribution of degree from an initially non-preferential state
within the framework of evolutionary game theory sug-
gests that even very simple coevolutionary rules might
lead to a strong segregation amongst participating players,
which is arguably advantageous for flourishing cooperative
states. We argue that the core mechanism responsible for
the emergence of heterogeneity in the degree distribution
presented in Fig. 5 can be related to the growth and pref-
erential attachment mechanism proposed by Baraba´si and
Albert [34]. In particular, our model incorporates pref-
erential attachment in that the probability of increasing
the degree is larger by players that have had successful
reproductions in the past since they are more likely to
reproduce in the future. Obviously, however, our model
does not incorporate growth since players are not added
in time. Nevertheless, since the evolution is halted by a
given kmax, preferential attachment alone can still lead to
highly heterogeneous but not scale-free distributions [34].
One may argue, however, that similar highly heteroge-
neous degree distributions can be obtained at higher kmax
as well, yet the promotion of cooperation is then still mod-
erate, as demonstrated in Fig. 2. This observation high-
lights that the heterogeneous distribution itself is not a
sufficient condition for ample levels of cooperation at high
temptations to defect. To uncover the additional decisive
p-4
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Fig. 5: Final distribution of degree P (k) in the studied pris-
oner’s dilemma game obtained for b = 1.26 via kmax = 50.
Note that the y axis has a logarithmic scale to clearly reveal
the heterogeneous outlay of P (k).
feature of resulting networks by different kmax, we study
the overlap of neighborhoods of the so-called influential
players, whereby a player is designated as influential if it
has the highest degree among any other players that can
adopt the strategy from the influential player via an ele-
mentary process. Figure 6 shows typical distributions of
influential players, which are denoted either green (coop-
erators) or red (defectors) depending on their strategy. In
addition, their neighborhoods, formed by those directly
linked to the influential players, are depicted yellow. The
distributions are plotted for different values of kmax but
for an identical temptation to defect equalling b = 1.2.
At small kmax there exist many influential players with
small neighborhoods surrounding them, yet the outlay is
virtually homogenous, and thus the promotion of cooper-
ation is not notably enhanced if compared to the square
lattice alone. Around the optimal kmax, however, influen-
tial players become fewer, and their neighborhoods larger.
Importantly though, the overlap between their neighbor-
hoods is still remarkable, which is crucial as it enables
influential cooperators to overtake influential defectors as
soon as the latter weaken their neighborhoods. As we will
show next, this effective information transfer between the
influential players is crucial for the feedback mechanism
to work. At higher kmax influential players become rarer
still, and their neighborhoods grow further, yet crucially,
the overlap between them vanishes, thus hindering influen-
tial cooperators to overtake influential defectors. In sum,
defectors are virtually undisturbed in exploiting their large
neighborhoods, ergo leading to a population in which de-
fection is widespread.
The impact of the above discussed topological feature
can be studied directly by measuring the information
transfer between influential players, which we realize via
aS quantifying the frequency of strategy adoptions be-
tween influential players in the stationary state of the pris-
oner’s dilemma game for each value of kmax. Figure 7
Fig. 6: Snapshots of typical distributions of players on a
100× 100 grid, obtained for kmax = 14 (left panel), kmax = 50
(middle panel) and kmax = 200 (right panel) at b = 1.2. Red
and green are influential players (see text for details) in de-
fector and cooperator states, respectively, while yellow are all
the direct neighbors of the depicted influential players. If a
player is neither influential nor belonging to a neighborhood of
an influential player it is marked white.
features the results, and in addition, shows the coopera-
tion level for the sake of comparison. Note that both aS
and ρC are depicted normalized with their maximal val-
ues (denoted as [aS ] and [ρC ] on the vertical axis), yet the
outlay of the curves thereby remains unaltered. At values
of kmax that are comparable to the initial degree of all
participating players the neighborhood size of influential
individuals is small. Thus, they cannot communicate effi-
ciently with one another, which ultimately results in low
values of aS . As the maximally attainable degree limit in-
creases the average neighborhood size of influential play-
ers grows as well. Consequently, direct strategy adoptions
between them become more frequent, and most crucially,
strong influential cooperative players can overtake weak-
ened influential defectors, in turn allowing the feedback
mechanism to blossom in the intermediate region of kmax.
Contrary, when kmax exceeds the optimal value some play-
ers become too influential and grow well separated neigh-
borhoods (see the right panel of Fig. 6), which hampers
the information exchange between them so that influential
defectors can prevail for prolonged periods of time despite
of their weak posture inflicted by the defecting neighbor-
hoods. Indeed, results presented in Fig. 7 show that the
level of information exchange, quantified via aS , and the
global cooperation level in a heterogeneous environment
are strongly bound to one another, following very similar
patterns depending on kmax, thus validating our reason-
ing. Moreover, it is worth noting that our explanation is in
agreement with a previous observation of Rong et al. [35],
who detected a fall of overall cooperation levels in the
prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks following
disassortative mixing, which also results in an enhanced
isolation of hubs.
Summary. – We have demonstrated that the intro-
duction of a very simple coevolutionary process to the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma game markedly improves survival
chances of cooperators in highly defection-prone environ-
ments, and moreover, enhances their overall dominance at
moderate temptations to defect. Most notably, the under-
p-5
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Fig. 7: Frequency of strategy adoptions between influential
players aS (closed circles) and the cooperation level ρC (open
circles) in dependence on kmax for b = 1.28. Both quantities
are normalized by their maximal values for better comparisons,
and are therefore decorated by square brackets on the corre-
sponding axis label. Lines are solely guides to the eye.
lying mechanism behind the reported promotion of coop-
eration is routed in the resulting highly heterogeneous net-
work structure which emerges spontaneously from a non-
preferential setup following a simple coevolutionary rule
that indirectly promotes players that are able to pass their
strategy by allowing them to extend their neighborhoods
via new connections to not yet linked players. Moreover,
we have shown that the newly introduced coevolutionary
rule yields optimal results if limited by a maximal degree
the most influential player is allowed to obtain. If this
limit is surpassed, the detrimental impact on the evolu-
tion of cooperation sets in due to the decreasing overlap
of neighborhoods of the influential players, which enables
defectors to reign in isolation from potentially stronger
influential cooperators. The success driven increase of de-
gree indirectly introduces a preferential attachment mech-
anism into the model, which combined with the limiting
kmax, results in heterogeneous degree distributions.
In sum, presented results confirm that the presence of
influential leaders is advantageous for cooperation, and
more importantly, that a simple ‘making new friends’ co-
evolutionary rule may bring about just the appropriate
diversity between participating players if appropriately
timed. The coevolutionary model demonstrates how influ-
ential leaders can evolve from an initially non-preferential
state, and that it is optimal for cooperation if their overall
density remains bounded to intermediate levels.
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